Eternal Return and Dalloway

After reading the last words of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, I feel an irresistable urge to pull back and view the work in totality.  Swiftly moving through the psyches of so many individuals makes the task of constructing a coherent reading difficult.  Still, it is clear that, above all, Reminiscence is the dominant theme of the work.

Reminiscence is not a ready-made category though, as there are any number of ways and purposes with which one can engage in the sentimental remembrance of one’s past.  A type of remembering that dominates the narrative form–and indeed the lives of most people–is that of regret.  Often, the journey backwards through the mind leads to an incessant nagging of one’s ghosts as to why a different road was not taken.  This is very much not the purpose of reminiscence in Mrs. Dalloway. On the contrary, each character clutches her past in disregard to the pain or pleasure such moments had in their own right and what future consequences they sowed.  In many ways, the celebratory style of remembrance exhibited by Woolf’s characters personify exemplify Nietzsche’s spiritual ideal, that of eternal return.

The ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo–not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this spectacle and who mkaes it necessary because again and again he needs himself–makes himself necessary (Beyond Good and Evil: 56)

This highest form of Nietzschean spirituality is not a tolerance of existence; nor is it a mere affirming of existence.  It is a uniform desire to embrace all that is good and evil, painful and pleasurable indiscriminately.  This ultimate in Yes-saying celebrates life for life’s sake and acknowledges all of the world’s so-called imperfections as integral to the singular  experience of existence.

Perhaps Clarissa exemplifies this life-positive ethic most infallibly.  The key turning point in her life was her decision to marry Richard instead of Peter.  While, there are key moments in the text where this alternative future is briefly flirted with, the certainty of Clarissa’s decision to resist her libidinal instincts and stake her life with her embodied superego is never in doubt.   Still, while Clarissa serves as center of the universe constructed by Woolf,  I take Peter to be an equally likely protagonist of the novel.  It is is his struggle that we are asked most to empathize with.  No matter how painful his  rejection from Clarissa is, both lived daily in reminiscence and in its lived reality in the present, it is abundantly clear how decidedly Peter clings to this pang of his heart, this pain of his life.   Furthermore, Peter does not regret his falling for Clarissa as the one love of his life, indeed, he would repeat this most sublime of imperfections, this excruciating lived experience, for it is this pain, this pursuit of pleasure, that gives his life meaning.  He wouldn’t have it any other way.

The Feminine Instinct

But women, he thought, shutting his pocket-knife, don’t know what passion is.  They don’t know the meaning of it to men (80).

Virginia Woolf writes these words in Mrs. Dalloway while inhabiting the mind of Peter Walsh–her earnest, idealist, iteration of everything that can be summoned has hopeful and flourishing among the male species.1

What is the passion that excites the hearts of men, and succeeds in awakening their soul to the morning of life?  In describing Clarissa Dalloway and what is so “purely feminine” about her we learn that she possesses

that extraordinary gift, that woman’s gift, of making a world of her own wherever she happened to be.  She came into a room; she stood, he had often seen her, in a doorway with lots of people round her.  But it was Clarissa one remembered.  Not that she was striking; not beautiful at all; there was nothing picturesque about her; she never said anything specially clever; there she was, however; there she was.

No, no, no! He was not in love with her any more! (76)

It is curious that what is so incredibly arousing about Woman for Mr. Walsh is not her form and curves (“not beautiful at all”), her flirtatious allure–her mystery.  No.  Instead it is the decidedly unsexual and unmysterious notion of the Feminine that Peter longs for.  In the passage, Peter notes woman’s gift of “making a world of her own wherever she happened to be.”  This obsession with interiority, endogeneity, homeliness (and thus totally unconcerned with the external, exogeneity, politics, etc.)—all so classically branded as feminine–is what Peter finds so appealing.  Furthermore, we do not look for her to be “clever” or active in the least.  In this glorified vision of woman, notice she is not running, dancing or moving at all, but solemnly (passively) standing.  What Man values from this image is the perception and environment Woman provides him.  There is an unmistakable air of comfortability, safety, and security that emanate from her unwavering standing; her incredible ease at encapsulating an enclosed home of her own around the Man so burdened with active, political life.  One is left with an utterly Freudian conception, Man does not search for a sexual object to exploit, but a mother figure to take shelter in.

We learn more concerning feminine utility on the next page:

These parties for example were all for him, or for her idea of him…Over and over again he had seen her take some raw youth, twist him, turn him, wake him up; set him going.  Infinite numbers of dull people conglomerated round her of course.  But odd unexpected people turned up; an artist sometimes; sometimes a writer; queer fish in that atmosphere…But she did it genuinely from a natural [feminine] instinct.

Woman is not just a place of refuge, but a cultivator of [male] life.  It is apt that Mrs. Dalloway begins with a journey for flowers as her role is that of humanity’s gardener.  From her inherent fertility results a “natural instinct.”  The feminine role is one of catalyzing, nurturing, and cultivating human flourishing.

1I preface what follows with the obligatory admission that I know nothing of literature or literary theory, and that I am aware of the extensive feminist theorizing of Woolf’s work.  Thus, while what follows will probably be an elementary observation (if even accurate), I hope it will serve fruitful in the development of my own thought (after all, what else could blogs hope to achieve in their most virtuous sense?).

Deficit Not the Problem

Just read this article in the New York Times on Obama’s plan to slash the deficit, claiming it to be the only way forward for “sustained growth.”  While ballooning national debt is never a good long-term vision, Obama needs to make sure he does not re-learn FDR’s lesson in the 1930s.  Nothing displeased John Maynard Keynes more then when FDR decided to cut back on his New Deal spending, putting off the real Keynesian injections needed until the huge military effort necessary for the United States’ entry into World War II.

That being said, Obama’s decision to reverse the Bush tax cuts on the oober-rich is a good move, notwithstanding what the NYT noted as the “widespread belief that raising taxes further depresses economic activity.”  More careful and less ideological analysis would reveal that taxes can a depressive or (dare I say) stimulative effect based on their design.  As anyone who has read the the radical leftist text The Wealth of Nations would know, the productive capacity of societies grows only through investment, i.e. the process of capital accumulation.   Wealthy people having more money (and the government having less tax revenue) whether ‘saving’ in a hoard or on consumption goods does not produce sustained growth.   (Similarly, the government spending-to-spend on consumption does not result in capital accumulation).   Real growth in capitalist economies can only occur when capitalist “savings” are transformed into capital, i.e. invested through the purchase of raw material and labor in the process of creating surplus.  Thus, taxes that reduce investment activity will have a depressive effect, while taxes that increase investment activity will have a stimulative effect.  If taxes on capitalist consumption are increased this will increase the relative desirability of directing that money towards investment activities.  This distinction between “spending” on production goods vs. consumption goods was overlooked by Keynes, but in it lies the real potential of Keynesian counter-cyclical policy.

Kristof Races To The Bottom

In a recent op-ed in The New York Times entitled “Dreaming of Sweatshops,” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/opinion/15kristof.html) acclaimed humanitarian columnist Nicholas Kristof offers some tough love to the millions living in extreme poverty as well as First World left. Contrary to impulsive leftists, increasing global labor standards will not ease poverty but will only increase the suffering of untold millions, forcing children to comb landfills for subsistence.

The best way to objectively analyze any argument it to examine the author’s problematization. In every case, one’s framing of the problem will dictate one’s solution (the converse also holds). For Kristof, poverty is caused by a lack of jobs (unemployment); thus the solution to poverty is to bring about the development of jobs (any job no matter how exploitative or lethal to the worker, environment, etc.). The premise is that any job—that is, any access to income in order to purchase the necessities of life no matter how marginal and painstakingly earned—is better than no job. To this end, Kristof attacks “labor standards” referring to the worker protections that reformist leftists lobby to be included in trade agreements. These minimum standards include the right to unionize (including the prohibition of union leader assassinations by paramilitary death squads, a regular occurrence in states like Colombia), minimum wage laws, prohibitions against child labor, etc. In doing so, free trade agreements are made conditional on the upholding of the most basic working conditions necessary for a livable life.

Kristof is parroting the familiar free market argument that well-intentioned liberals actually hurt poor people by interfering with the market through activist public policy. This hallmark of neoliberal orthodoxy is the ready-made counterargument to any welfare state measure. For example, whenever there is pressure from communities to institute or raise the minimum wage, mainstream economists, politicians, and business leaders immediately denounce the measure as a “job killer”. The logic of the argument rests on the curtailment of workers’ “freedom” to negotiate a wage lower than the arbitrary level set as the minimum by the state. (By mandating that entrepreneurs pay Cambodian workers $1 per day would-be garbage scroungers are disenfranchised from bargaining for fifty cents per day). Furthermore, on a city, state, or nation-wide level, the mandate to pay an above market wage rate will create a disincentive from investing in that area; in other words, potential investors would choose to take their jobs some place cheaper.

The bottomline is that any job, that is, any access to the means of survival, is better than none. This is all well and fine, but what underlies the intuitive dissatisfaction resulting from this conclusion? Why are we not happy with the five year old working 16-hour days in a factory instead of scrounging about in toxic landfills? Kristof’s argument inevitably brings about two challenges. It is true that if Cambodia mandates certain labor standards that do not exist in say Thailand, there will be a disincentive for firms to invest in Cambodia and an incentive to invests in countries with lower production costs. However, what is the long-term global development strategy for poverty alleviation given this framework? One can easily understand that if Texas, Alabama and New York continue to lower corporate taxes and slash wages to attract investment, the result can only be a race to the bottom, as capital consistently switches its direction to find the lowest, most miserable, and exploitative labor and environmental conditions. The clear alternative to end the vicious spiral downward of living and environmental conditions is the institution of universal labor and environmental standards. The necessary institutions like the World Trade Organization already exist to implement such a global accord that would provide all countries an equal playing ground in the competition for foreign direct investment.

The second objection to Kristof’s argument is a more radical one where one would begin to problematize why a human being’s very survival is dependent on the profitability calculus of some foreign billionaire? Is there something wrong with a system in which the only way any human can attain the necessary means of survival is by selling their labor? Why has human society “progressed” to such a point where persons are deprived of land or means of subsistence and are forced to rely on the benevolence of foreign exploiters to feed their children? Continuing down such a line of reasoning leads to a fuller problematization of growing world poverty—an economic system in which dead labor (i.e. capital) condemns a plurality of living labor to absolute misery.

The Attack on Marriage

The debate over gay marriage always lacked a certain allure.  The denial of civil rights based on sexual orientation constitutes a gross injustice; however, what is at stake  ideationally and politically?  Recent developments appear to follow the historically consistent experience of gradually increased participation in established democratic institutions structures, which characterize the pattern of political development of most polyarchies.1 Indeed, while a legitimate and important political battle for civil rights, we can reassure ourselves that the debates surrounding so-called “same-sex marriage” are the spectacle they appear.  There are the proponents of enlightenment values of liberalism on the one side, versus the same old Mike Huckabee, Rich Warren agents of intolerance on the other.

If the scene of frumpy, middle-aged San Franciscans tying the knot doesn’t raise any eyebrows, the discursive weapons of the aforementioned intolerant agents should catch one’s eye.  From the “Defense of Marriage Act” President Clinton signed in the late 90s, to the millions of signs grazing lawns from Ohio to California demanding to “defend marriage” and “protect our families,” the invocation of a discourse of security is bound to leave progressives confused if not amused.  Does gay marriage constitute a threat to heterosexual couples?

In her discussion of violence against the Queer community and its motivations, Judith Butler states:

The person who threatens violence proceeds from the anxious and rigid belief that a sense of world and a sense of self will be radically undermined if such a being, uncategorizable, is permitted to live within the social world.  The negation, through violence, of that body is a vain and violent effort to restore order, to renew the social world on the basis of intelligible gender, and to refuse the challenge to rethink the world as something other than natural or necessary (Undoing Gender: 34).

Butler’s argument hinges on a notion of survival–both ontologically and physically–made possible by an individual locating herself within a system of established categories of identity.  In this view, the extent to which a life is livable is a function of how one’s society circumscribes what is human, that is, the arrangement of norms which regulate how a human can be recognized as such.  To live outside these categories is to be unintelligible to the social world, unrecognizable as human.  To those outside the boundaries of normality, the political battle to change cultural and institutional kinship norms is a necessary movement to maintain personal security. The maintenance of norms excluding queer couples from recognition threaten both the bodily security of those excluded–fostering the kind of violence responsible for the murder of Dwan Prince”2–as well as threaten the sense of self and humanness of queer individuals.

The invocation of security discourse in defending traditional marriage should not be treated with derision, and must instead be understood as the natural reaction from a community that is under assault. In their battle for recognition, queer couples are undermining the current social structure, forcing solidified identities into flux. There are casualties in the assault on heteronormativity, namely, the norms and categories that give meaning and legibility to heteronormative couples. The social, juridical, and violent push-back against marriage liberalization constitute an effort to restore order, renewing a reading of the world with legibly gendered subjects. The defensive rhetoric of gay marriage antagonists is symptomatic of the struggle at hand, a normative mission of rethinking love beyond gendered, heteronomrative subjects.

1Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy.

2“Arrest made in Brooklyn gay murder case, ” The Advocate. http://www.advocate.com/news_detail_ektid17801.asp

On The Limits of ‘Soul-Force’ and Its Modern Application

Through the social movements he led in South Africa and India, Mahatma Gandhi successfully justified the philosophy of nonviolence on both moral and pragmatic grounds. This essay will begin by analyzing the limits of nonviolence discussed by Gandhi and use critiques of his philosophy to better elaborate the nuance of his thought. This initial treatment will be followed by an engagement with the nature of power by fusing ideas found in the works of Gandhi and Hannah Arendt. Lastly, the utility of Gandhi’s resistance program will be discussed in its application to the uniquely modern ways in which is power exercised.

While Gandhi’s nonviolence is often framed by critics as “bordering on fanaticism” (as Lord Reading cautiously and respectfully stated upon his visit with Gandhi), upon reading Gandhi’s writings it is worthwhile noting how reasoned and calculated his plea for nonviolence is (142). When wishing to discourage the use of nonviolence critics often point to the poverty of the philosophy when confronted with an immediate physical assault requiring defensive action.1 Do you allow an assailant to kill a child or do you use any means necessary to intervene? Despite the dificulties of many practitioners of nonviolence to reconcile such a dilemma, Gandhi remains undeterred, in his words, “I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence” (137). Gandhi elaborates that in the event his son was confronted with the grim choice of watching his father die or active intervention, Gandhi states that it is the duty of his son “to defend me even by using violence” (137).

Many activists often issue a call for violence by reductively framing the situation in such a way that violence and cowardice are the only two potential responses. Such attempts at reductive logic no doubt occurred in India as well. It is appropriate then that with his call for steadfast nonviolence Gandhi offers a nuanced diagnosis of the problem India faces and with it an equally nuanced prescription. Gandhi presents a complex statement as to the nature of the British domination of the Indian people.

It is as amazing as it is humiliating that less than one hundred thousand white men would be able to rule three hundred and fifteen million Indians. They do so somewhat undoubtedly by force but more by securing our cooperation in a thousand ways and making us more and more helpless and dependent on them as time goes forward…The British cannot rule us by mere force…If we refuse to supply them with men and money, we achieve our goal, Swaraj, equality, manliness (138, my emphasis).

While the British used force to obtain Indian obedience, the disproportionality of population size, as well as the sheer geographic scope of India, make such rule exclusively by force woefully inadequate. The principal methods by which Britain maintained its hegemony were firstly, through securing the active cooperation of Indian subjects, and secondly, through the infantilization of India, that is, dependency cultivated by the British upon the colonized. From this specific problematization follows an equally specific plan of action: noncompliance with the structural forces that ensure British domination, and the assertion of Indian autonomy. Examples of these prescriptions in practice include Gandhi’s call for national day of fast and prayer (a general nationwide strike), as well as his call for a boycott of British clothing with a concomitant urging of Indian families to again begin spinning their own cloth.

Gandhi’s reflections on colonial India make clear that he does not believe a regime derives its power from its ability to wield brute force, but through the active cooperation of its subjects. Gandhi’s view is then quite similar to that espoused by Hannah Arendt in her book of essays On Violence, where she maintains that not only should violence be removed from any definition of power, but that violence is the opposite of power. The real source of power, she argues, resides in legitimacy, not so much in its normative sense, but in a power-holder’s ability to ensure compliance from its subjects. The instruments of violence and terror can engineer obedience through coercion, but only power in its true form can elicit complicity and cooperation. Like Arendt, Gandhi believes the state resorts to violence out of weakness, that is, when it lacks the ability to produce consent via legitimacy (134). Given the understanding of power provided by Gandhi and Arendt, the plan of action outlined by Gandhi is the rational way to undermine British rule. Since the British cannot rule by brute force alone, they require real power, real cooperation, real active consent to maintain control. It is only by a refusal to comply with such a system that the actual power of the British Empire in India can ever be undermined.

I hope to have established that the strength of Gandhi’s method of resistance does not only lie with its moral integrity but in its ability to undermine power at its roots. In light of this utility, I now wish to turn to how the implementation of Gandhian Satyagraha, or Soul-Force, could potentially be utilized in the undermining of other forms of power, namely, biopower. Throughout his work Michel Foucault chronicles the development of power, paying keen interest to the transition into modernity. At the beginning of such a transition the sovereign’s authority over the lives of his subjects derived from his ability to kill, that is, deprive them of life. However, as modernity blossomed, so did the ability of the political authority to regulate the lives of its subjects. The negative exercise of power through punitive measure of taking a life, gave way to positive forms of power. Instead of the threat of infringement or attack on life, life was now made to live through the active regulation, aid, and supervision of the state. With the institution of biopower war ceases to be the defense of the sovereign, instead, wholesale slaughters are demanded by the ‘mangers of life’ to secure the population’s very survival.2

If one aims to resist domination, one must get at the nature of that oppression and undermine the means by which it is exercised. Like British imperialism in India, the maintenance of biopower does not depend on violence, but achieves its control through profound integration with the most atomized, intimate and mundane activities of modern life. While biopower’s invisible, ether-like qualities allow for subtler manifestations than the power at work in colonial India, a similar application of “Soul-Force” will be necessary for its destruction. It is only through non-cooperation with the instruments that biopower uses to sustain itself that it can ever be undone. Thus, like British domination in colonial India, the only way to extricate the tentacles of biopower from society is through a systematic noncompliance with its administration of life on an individual level, accompanied with a collective assertion of autonomy that rejects its authority on ideational and moral grounds.

1 Jensen, Derrick, Endgame New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006

2 Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, New York: Vintage Books, 1990: pp.135-145

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